INTRODUCTION
The past decade has witnessed a significant change in the nature and volume of Arab migration. The rapid increase in the financial assets of the major oil producing states in the region since 197 3/74 and their adoption of ambitious development plans provided a qualitative transformation of the migration process among the Arab states. The transformation was multifaceted. Some of the oil-producing states, such as Iran and Iraq, ceased to be labor exporters and became the importers of labor from non-oil neighbouring states and from Asian countries. As a result, the unemployment problems of some of the non-oil producing states such as Jordan and, to a lesser extent, Egypt vanished in the late 1970s.
The purpose of this paper is to survey the record to date. What have been the major migratory patterns? How have these affected the flow of remittances in the Arab world? What structural characteristics have been associated with these developments?
PATTERNS OF MIGRATION IN THE ARAB WORLD
Labor migration in the Arab World has gone through at least five major phases in the post World War II period: 1 -During the inter-war period to October 1973, migration was characterized by two types of movement. Egyptians (and to a lesser extent, Jordanians) migrated to other Arab countries, principally as teachers and administrators, staffing the administrative framework of the Gulf States. Their small numbers made control of the migration process possible, since it required minimal organization and regulation by the governments of both the sending and receiving states. In addition, there was some migration of unskilled workers for work in the service and construction sector of various states -Yemenis to Saudi Arabia and Sudanese to Egypt.
In general, most of the migrant workers originated from other Arab states, and no single migrant group dominated the labor force of any one labor receiving country, with the exception of 200,000-250,000 Yemenis workiJig in Saudi Arabia. Together with an estimated 94,000 Egyptians, 92,000 Syrians and 71,000 Palestinians, they represented the majority of the half million Arabs working abroad at the time.
-The oil price increases of 1973174 spurred a second wave of migration. Arab countries experienced large scale adjustments in their national labor forces and a general expansion of economic activity. The number of expatriate workers expanded to 1,800,000 between 1970 and 1975 , with most of the increases occurring in the last two years. Both the labor importing and labor exporting states found that growth demand for labor taxed the minimal regulatory policies and mechanisms in place. At the same time, sending states eagerly sought to encourage rather than constrain the export of labor.
-The third phase of interstate migration in the Middle East evolved through the latter part of the 1980s. Arab workers continued to migrate but the Gulf States began to recruit large numbers of South Asian workers. As early as 1975, Indians and Pakistanis accounted for 18 percent of all migrant workers. From less than 200,000 in 1975, the number of Pakistanis working in the Middle East increased to 500,000 in 1977; by 1979 this had reached 1.25 million. The large scale entry of Asians into the labor markets of the Middle East was a response to the increased demand for migrant workers. By the end of the 70s, Asians were almost as numerous as Arabs in the foreign workforces of the region.
-The fourth phase began at the end of the 1970s and is characterized by a growing complexity in Asian labor: Koreans, Taiwanese, Filipinos and others began to appear in great numbers. At the same time, governments in both sending and receiving countries assumed a much more active role in managing the migration process. During the fourth phase, mobility was characterized by its sheer magnitude relative to national labor markets. Almost every state in the region was participating in the migration process. In the Gulf States alone, there may have been 3.5 to 4.65 million migrants in a combined labor force of 9 million workers-migrants, constituting about 40-46 percent of the labor force.
-By this time the governments of the Gulf States could no longer refrain from policy intervention. They began urging, if not forcing, migrants to return home upon completion of their contracts. Visa, residency and citizenship laws were strengthened and pressure was put on the business sector to adhere to recruitment and employment procedures. South Korean work camp projects were seen as an attractive alternative to expanding the expatriate communities already in place, while at the same time minimizing the visibility of the foreign workers.
-The final phase began in the mid-l 980s, a period of stabilization in the total number of migrants. The migration process at present appears to be characterized by a shift toward the import of more highly skilled labor, a concomitant shift in the sectoral allocation of labor from construction to industry and services and a relatively small increase in the proportion of East Asian workers.
In terms of the actual pattern of employment (Tables 1 and 2 , pages 569 and 570), the Gulf States vary considerably in terms of the relative importance of foreign workers. In 1985, foreign 2 workers comprised well over 80 percent of the workforce in Qatar and the UAE. Next in terms of foreign worker dependence was Kuwait, where nearly 65 percent of the workforce were non-nationals. Despite many public statements of the government's avowed goal to reduce its dependence on foreign workers, non-national workers increased their share of the Saudi-Arabian workforce from 34 percent in 197 5 to nearly 50 percent by 1985.
The labor' exporting countries were led bl Egypt on an absolute basis. However, Jordan, Lebanon, Oman, Yemen Arab Republic and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen had much higher percentages of their labor force working overseas.
The sectoral distribution of the foreign workforce (Table 3 , page 5 71) has varied somewhat from country to country, but aggregate figures are fairly accurate depictions of the situation in the individual economies. In 1973, non-nationals dominated two sectors: construction, where their share was 79 percent, and manufacturing, where their share was 6 7 percent.
Only in agriculture was the percentage of non-nationals low (9 percent). The traditional nature of agriculture explains this slight representation of migrants, because international migration to these countries tends to be to the modem rather than the traditional sector. This situation has changed somewhat over the years in Saudi Arabia and Libya, where modernization of the agricultural sector and withdrawal of national labor from it increased the demand for foreign labor.
The figures in Table 2 (page 570), anticipate that the percentage of foreign labor in each sector would increase through 1985, even in the low forecast for that year.
Three scenarios have been developed to assess the likely patterns of migration into the 1990s: -For the Gulf States 4 , migration reaches a plateau in the mid to late 1980s and then declines. This is due in part to structural change in the economies of the labor importers, in conjunction with weakening financial surpluses and emerging political opposition to continued unbridled growth, motivated in part by the large numbers of migrants in these host countries. A downward slide in the price of crude petroleum accentuates these trends.
-The relatively slow growth of national labor forces combined with continued strong demand for labor, results in a stabilization and even an increase in the flows of workers to the Gulf countries 5 .
-The willingness of Asian workers to accept rapidly lowering wages and deteriorating conditions of employment will cause their numbers to hold up as long as the recession lasts. As employers have been able to secure equivalent skills for lower prices, they have delayed exporting workers. When the oil markets revive (around 1990 ) the number of foreign workers will be greater than in 1987 (but not their peak of 1984). Greater participation by local women will tend to reduce the demand for some types of foreign workers 6 .
PATTERNS OF REMITTANCES
By the early 1980s, there were probably some six million migrant workers in the six Gulf States, of whom over two million were Arabs, about 3. 7 million from Asia, and the rest from Africa, Europe and the Americas. This compares with only about 660,000 migrant workers in 1970, the product of the earlier boom and 1,250,000 in 1975 -perhaps a fifth of whom were Asians.
Obviously, the migration oflabor has been tied very closely to the oil price boom. This has occurred in two important ways. It was the boom which vastly increased the demand for labor in the oil exporting countries, while at the same time giving the labor sending countries every incentive to try to compensate for the crippling rise in the cost of their oil imports by encouraging their citizens to work abroad and remit as large a portion of their wages as possible.
There is considerable controversy concerning the actual magnitude of remittances in the region. It is apparent that under-reporting is a problem. Formal channels capture only part of the remittances, but the exact percentage is far from clear 7 . Research on remittances from France to North Africa, for example, suggests that around 20 percent of remittances are not transmitted by money order, but through less formal channels. Remittances may also be made in kind, with the goods sometimes being resold after clearing customs -a practice which exporting governments are trying to eliminate 8 .
In terms of the official statistics, remittances are included in the balance of payment figures under 'unrequited transfers'. These are offsetting entries for the provision of real resources or financial items by one economy to another without a quid-pro-quo. This means that whenever a given economy does not receive (supply) a recompense in the form of real resources or financial items for goods, services, or capital supplied to (or received from) another economy, the balance of payment statement records an unrequited transfer. The value of the unrequited transfer has to be the same as that of the real and financial resources to which the unrequited transfer is offset.
Several trends stand out in the recorded 9 volume of remittances (Tables 4-7 , pages 572-575): -Despite the post-1982 fall in oil prices and revenues, many of the Arab labor exporting countries have been able to maintain and even increase their remittances. For example, Jordan's remittances in 1986 were higher than those received at the height of the oil boom ( 1981 ) . The same is also true for Tunisia and Egypt although, in the latter case, the 1986 level of remittances was lower than that received in 1980.
-The usual case, however, has been for a fall-off in remittances in recent years. This decline has been fairly dramatic for several of the major exporters, including the two Y emens and Sudan.
-The labor importers are dominated by Saudi Arabia. While this country's remittances have fallen off somewhat in recent years, the 1986 figures had not declined in a manner commensurate with the country's oil revenues. While oil revenues have fallen from around $95 billion in 1981 to about $20 billion in 1986, remittances declined from $5.3 billion in 1981 to $4. 9 billion in 1986. -On the other hand, several of the labor importers actually had higher levels of remittance payments in 1986 than in the early 1980s. Kuwait, the second largest labor importer actually had significantly larger remittances in 1986 than experienced in 1981 or 1982. The same also applies to Bahrain whose remittances in 1982 were over twice those of 1980. The same is true of Oman.
How significant are these foreign cµrrency inflows for the recipient countries? Again, keeping in mind that the actual level of remittances is most likely understated, it is still apparent that they account for significant shares of gross national product. The following patterns are of particuar interest (Tables 8, page 576 and 9, page 577): -Most importantly, it is apparent that many of the countries receive a significant proportion, often well over half, of their foreign exchange from remittances. Jordan falls in this category, as do Egypt and the Sudan in recent years. As is well known, the Yemens receive most of their foreign exchange from this source.
-While leveling off in absolute terms in recent years, remittances have been increasing as a share of export earnings for several of the major exporters: Jordan, Egypt, the Y emens, Tunisia, and Sudan have all had remittances score significant increases in their share of exports. -On the other hand, there has been a leveling off or even slight decline in the importance of remittances in the overall Gross Domestic Product of several of the major labor exporters. These include PDR Yemen, and perhaps Jordan and Egypt. Remittances have increased in relative importance in the economies of Yemen Arab Republic and perhaps Sudan.
Before testing for the impact that labor exportation may have in the Middle East, it is instructive to examine some of the major structural differences between the labor importers and exporters. Several measures of both output and expenditures were examined (Table IO, page 578 ).
-Sectorial Composition of Output. To reduce the effect of fluctuating oil revenues on the sectoral composition of output, the shares of the major productive sectors were examined in terms of their percentage of non-oil Gross Domestic Product. The major sectors considered were: (a) agriculture, (b) manufacturing, (c) construction, (d) services, (e) distribution 
STRUCTURAL DIFFERENCES
In terms of the major differences between labor exporters and importers over time: -As might be expected from the geography of the region, the labor importers have a relatively small share of non-oil output devoted to agriculture -this share seems to have stabilized at around 5 percent of non-oil GDP. The share of agriculture in the labor exporting countries also appears to have stabilized for the time being at around 25 percent of non-oil GDP.
-In general, the labor importing countries have, relative to their labor exporting counterparts, considerably higher shares of their non-oil output accounted for by construction, services and, to a lesser extent, distributive activities. The shares of these activities have been more stable in the case of the labor exporting countries. -On the expenditure side, major differences exist between the two groups of countries, with labor importers historically having absorption rates below total output and the labor exporters spending more than they produce. This phenomenon is reflected both in the higher absorption to GDP rate for the exporters and the higher resource gap (exports minus imports) to GDP for the labor importers.
-In recent years, government expenditures have accounted for a higher percentage of expenditures in the labor importing countries, although in 197 5 the labor exporters had a higher share of total government expenditures and military expenditures. -The resource gap, although narrowing in recent years, was positive for the labor importers throughout the period under consideration, indicating a balance of payments surplus for the group as a whole. Correspondingly, the labor exporters experienced a chronic balance of payments deficit throughout this period. -While labor importers had a significantly higher rate of imports to total expenditures in both 1975 and 1980, they ended the period with rates identical to those experienced by the labor exporters.
These trends reveal significant differences between the labor importers. In particular, major differences lie in the sectoral composition of output.
CONCLUSIONS
Surveys of this sort always raise more questions than they answer. In particular, future research is needed to answer the following questions: -Have remittances been channelled into productive investment or have they played a minor role in the development of the major labor exporters? Table 1 Estimates Countries, 1976 -1986 (Abu Dhabi, Arab Monetary Fund, September 1988 . Table 6 Worker Remittances in the Arab World: Labor Importers, 1976 Importers, -1981 [1973] [1974] , la migraci6n laboral ha venido constituyendo un factor principal en las economias de! mundo arabe. El objeto del presente articulo es pasar revista a la cuesti6n desde entonces hasta la fecha. (.Cuales han sido las principales modalidades de la migraci6n? l,C6mo han influido sobre la corriente de remesas financieras en esa region? l. Que caracteristicas estructurales han llegado a vincularse con este proceso? Una de las principales comprobaciones del estudio fue que si bien las remesas financieras han venido nivelandose en terminos absolutos durante estos ultimos aiios, las remesas han ido en incremento como porcentajes de los ingresos provenientes de! comercio exterior de la mayoria de los paises exportadores: en efecto, tan to Jordania y Egipto como ambos Yemenes, Tunez y Sudan han registrado importantes aumentos en la participaci6n de las remesas dentro de! volumen de los ingresos de la exportaci6n.
A la inversa, se ha producido una nivelaci6n y hasta una ligera reducci6n de la parte correspondiente a las remesas en el producto nacional bruto de varios de los principales paises exportadores de recursos humanos. Ent11e ellos se cuentan la RPD de Yemen y quizas tambien Jordaniay Egipto. En cambio, las remesas han aumentado su importancia relativa en las economias de la RA de Yemen, y quizas tambien de Sudan.
Es interesante destacar que, en terminos estructurales, si bien los paises importadores de recursos humanos han registrado un tasa significativa mas elevada de las importaciones en relaci6n con el total de sus gastos tanto en 1975 como en 1980, llegaron a finalizar el periodo con proporciones identicas a las de los paises exportadores de recurses humanos.
